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POL2 336: Transitional Justice 











 In September 2013, I enjoyed an “afternoon tea” with a seemingly normal 
Chilean family. We laughed, ate cake, and lazed around in the backyard watching two 
of the younger boys kick around a soccer ball. When someone wanted a coffee, I 
volunteered to go inside and fill up a mug. Reaching into the kitchen cabinet, I pulled 
out a random mug, glanced down, and gasped. The mug was plastered with a photo of 
General Augusto Pinochet surrounded by hearts and a cursive “Mi Héroe” (“My 
hero”) printed around the edge. My American history books had taught me that 
General Pinochet was a universally reviled dictator who had violently come to power 
in Chile and committed thousands of human rights crimes over a 17-year reign. How 
could anyone call him “my hero”? Over the course of five months in Chile, I learned 
that support for Pinochet, including his coup and military rule, was actually an 
enduring phenomenon vigorously endorsed by a small, but strong, section of Chilean 
society. Many of these supporters acknowledged that human rights crimes had been 
perpetrated but considered them morally justified.  
In this paper I will seek to examine how this loyalty to the dictatorship or 
“pinochetismo” has endured or diminished following mechanisms of transitional 
justice. I begin with a description of the enduring Pinochet loyalty in Chilean society 
and examine the historical context that produced the justifications for military rule. 
Historical context is salient because Chile’s distinctive pre-coup situation and pacted 
transition have hampered the effectiveness of traditional strategies for justice and 
reconciliation. I then analyze truth commissions, prosecutions, and public 
commemorations and conclude that denial of guilt continued after each of these 




1990s. Support for Pinochet,1 measured by both public opinion polls and political 
actions, has declined significantly since the return to democracy in 1990 but this is 
due in large part to surprising events such as a Pinochet corruption scandal and the 
student mobilizations of 2011. In other words, pinochetismo persists but may be 
eradicated slowly and in unexpected ways.  
Indicators of pinochetismo 
 
 Vehement justifications for the coup, role of General Pinochet, and oppressive 
military government are not just exemplified by coffee mugs. A 2013 newspaper 
investigation2 found that 113 major Chilean businessmen, and the municipality of 
Vitacura, had donated millions to the Pinochet Foundation, a foundation dedicated to 
defending the legacy of Pinochet.  In 2012 the Pinochet Foundation and the 
September 11th Corporation (which honors the day of the coup d’état) staged a 
national screening of the documentary Pinochet glorifying the General’s rule.3 At the 
screening, the president of the Union of Retired Officials of the National Defense 
(UNOFAR) declared that, “Pinochet’s image has been defamed, and they have tried 
to destroy his image. But I will reiterate, he was the best president in Chile and he is 
the one who made Chile go from being a mediocre country to the jewel of America.”4  
This sentiment is shared by Twitter users who refer to Pinochet as "tata" (daddy) and 
the tens of thousands who have liked the Pinochet Foundation’s Facebook page.5  
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2
 Nicolás Sepúlveda “113 empresarios y el municipio de Vitacura financian a la Fundación Pinochet” 
El Dínamo, September 9, 2013. http://www.eldinamo.cl/2013/09/09/113-empresarios-y-el-municipio-
de-vitacura-financian-a-la-fundacion-presidente-pinochet/   
3
 Luis Andres Henao “Augusto Pinochet Documentary Sparks Protests Over Chilean Dictator’s 
Legacy” Huffington Post (AP), June 10, 2012, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/06/10/augusto-
pinochet-documentary_n_1584703.html  
4
 Sumy Sadurni “Pinochet Remains a Strongly Divisive Figure in Chilean Public Opinion” Merco 








A 2010 national opinion poll found that 12.09% of the population believed that a coup 
by the armed forces would be justified and the legislator Guillermo Teillier has 
repeatedly remarked that the Congress is full of legislators who “idolize Pinochet” 
and defend the 1973 coup.6  On the 40th anniversary of the coup, that saw thousands 
imprisoned and hundreds killed, Chilean President Sebastián Piñera claimed that the 
coup was a “predictable outcome” caused by the President Salvador Allende’s 
“violations of the rule of law.”7  Government officials have not only justified the 
violent coup. In 2012 the government mandated that school textbooks refer to the 
Pinochet’s 17-year authoritarian dictatorship as simply a “military government.”8  All 
of these examples show ongoing, conflicting historical narratives in Chilean society.  
Before examining if the justifications or denials of guilt have diminished due to 
mechanisms of transitional justice, we must first understand the context and impacts 
of Chile’s history.  
Background 
Before Pinochet 
 On September 11th, 1973 Chilean armed forces launched one of the most violent 
military coups in Latin American history,9 overthrowing the democratically elected 
President Salvador Allende and ushering in a 17-year military dictatorship.  The 
presidential palace was bombed, tanks rolled through the streets of the Capitol, and in 
less than two months more than 40,000 “political enemies” were rounded up and 
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http://internacional.elpais.com/internacional/2014/03/07/actualidad/1394215652_706087.html 
7
 Alfonso Serrano “The other 9/11: Chile marks coup’s 40th anniversary” Aljazeera America, 
September 11, 2013. http://america.aljazeera.com/articles/2013/9/11/the-other-9-11-
chilemarkscoupas40thanniversary.html 
8
 Steven Bodzin “Chile textbook controversy: Pinochet’s rule now a military ‘regime,’ not a 
‘dictatorship’” Christian Science Monitor, January 6, 2012. 
http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Americas/Latin-America-Monitor/2012/0106/Chile-textbook-
controversy-Pinochet-s-rule-now-a-military-regime-not-a-dictatorship   
9
 “The military coup of September 11, 1973 was one of the most violent in Latin American history, 
demonstrating the depth of the political polarization and class conflict in Chilean society.”  See 




imprisoned in the National Stadium.10 Death squads and torture centers quickly 
disintegrated the Allende supporters and forced many to go into hiding or exile.  The 
1973 coup shocked the world, largely because Chile had enjoyed a strong democratic 
tradition and a reputation as one of the most stable countries in Latin America.11 
However a detailed analysis of the political, economic, and social situation leading up 
the coup illustrates one of the primary reasons for a contested historical narrative. 
Chilean society was fragmented and in chaos, and thus General Pinochet actions are 
frequently justified as “inevitable.”   
The Chilean political system was deeply fractured in 1973. Salvador Allende, 
representing the Unidad Popular (Popular Unity), a coalition of left wing, socialist, 
and communist parties, only won 36.6% of the national vote in the 1970 presidential 
election and required a deeply divided Congress12 to confirm his presidency.  
Allende’s narrow political victory was quickly thrashed by a series of economic 
crises. A major drop in food production occurred after the Allende administration 
took over essentially all major estates and redistributed the land in tiny plots to 
resident workers. At the same time a decline in the international price of copper, 
which represented over 80% of Chile’s GDP, precipitated unemployment, a shortage 
of government revenue, and massive deficit spending.13  Price controls led to 
shortages and inflation rates increased by 300% between 1972 and 1973.14 Massive 
labor strikes in 1972 and 1973 over hyperinflation and wages merely served to 
illustrate the severity of the economic situation in Chile.  
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In addition to political fragmentation and an economic crisis, Chile was also faced 
with widespread social unrest. In August of 1973, thousands of Chileans gathered to 
protest the rising costs and shortages of food and fuel. The economic situation made 
the Christian Democrats, a major political party of the center, and much of the middle 
class leave the Undidad Popular coalition and join the economic elites and political 
Right opposed to Allende.15  The Allende government lost considerable legitimacy 
when the Chilean Supreme Court declared its socialist land redistribution program 
unconstitutional and the Chamber of Deputies passed a resolution calling on the 
armed forces to maintain order. A far left guerrilla movement, the MIR, responded to 
threats from the Right by building up arsenals in local towns across the country. 
Chilean society became increasingly polarized, with divisions publically accentuated 
by political groups and the branches of government.  
There are many contested interpretations of the political, economic, and social 
situation leading up the coup.  Carlos Hunees, a professor and executive director of 
CERC (Centro de Estudios de la Realidad Contemporánea or “Center for the Study 
of Contemporary Reality”), has famously argued that the “civil war” story is a myth. 
He posits that Chile’s polarization in 1973 is overemphasized, compared to the 
fragmentation at other points in Chilean history, and caricatured to make military 
intervention appear justified and inevitable.16 However, as seen in the continued 
justifications for human rights abuses, many Pinochet supports claim that Pinochet 
saved Chile from imminent collapse.17 This “heroic memory and countermemory”18 is 
woven through historical accounts of Chile’s pre-coup situation.  
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The Pinochet Years  
Augosto Pinochet, the General of the armed forces, ruled Chile on behalf of a 
military junta from 1973-1990. A report by the Valech Commission found that there 
were more than 40,000 recorded victims of human rights violations during this period 
in Chile.  3,216 people have been officially recognized as desaparecidos 
(“disappeared”) or murdered and 38,254 people are recognized as survivors of 
political imprisonment and/or torture.19 The vast majority of the human rights 
violations occurred on September 11th or during the brutal repression of dissidents in 
the months following the coup. It’s estimated that by 1974 at least 15,000 Chilean 
refugees had fled to Argentina and 1,500 to Peru.20 During the dictatorship, human 
rights violations were widely denied by the press,21 opposition parties were banned, 
and thousands of dissidents sought political asylum in foreign countries.22 Despite 
these human rights violations, the economic growth and stability during the Pinochet 
years remain key justifications for Pinochet loyalty. 
While suppressing dissent, Pinochet simultaneously embarked on transforming the 
Chilean economy into a privatized, neoliberal system. Major foreign loans and 
investments from companies such as Dow Chemical flowed into Chile. Exports and 
GDP increased and the country set out to tackle inflation. After 1983, the Pinochet 
government added aggressive export promotion to its neoliberal policies and the Chile 
economy finally enjoyed stable growth. Between 1983 and 1993 Chile’s GDP grew at 
an average rate of 7.5 per cent annually.23 The changes in Chile’s economy garnered 
                                                                                                                                                              
18
 Steve Stern “Forward”,in The Politics of Memory in Chile: From Pinochet to Bachelet, ed. Collins, 
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the name “the Miracle of Chile”24 and, despite increases in unemployment and cuts to 
social services, privatization was widely praised by the World Bank.25 The neoliberal 
economics of the dictatorship have remained largely intact since the transition to 
democracy and are a critical factor in understanding positive perceptions of the 
military rule.  
In addition to brutal repression and economic growth, the Pinochet years were 
marked by attempts to establish legitimacy and a pacted, peaceful transition back to 
democracy. In 1980, Pinochet introduced a new “constitution” as a national 
referendum. The new constitution was approved by more than 2/3 of the voters 
(however there are widespread claims of election fraud and voter intimidation)26 and 
made Pinochet officially “President” of the republic for an 8-year term. The 1980 
Constitution gave the President broad powers but ordered a transition from a military 
junta to a civil legislative body by 1988.  The plan allowed Pinochet to maintain 
power under the auspices of constitutional legitimacy. However, to the surprise of 
some, Pinochet lost the national plebiscite in 1988 and Chile began an early transition 
to democracy. Almost 56% of the voters said “No” to extending Pinochet’s rule by 
eight years while 44% said “Yes.”  Nowhere else has a brutal dictatorship ended as a 
result of a peaceful national vote. Pinochet’s decision to rely on a plebiscite played to 
Chilean values for stability and order and allowed him to orchestrate his own exit. 
The historical portrait of pre-coup and post-coup Chile elucidates the factors behind 
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Pinochet’s broad support and his powerful influence over the choice of transitional 
justice mechanisms during the democratic transition.27  
Transitional Justice Mechanisms 
 We move now to critically assess the effectiveness of truth commissions, 
prosecutions, and public commemorations at diminishing pinochetismo.  
Truth Commissions   
The 1990 National Truth and Reconciliation Commission was implemented in an 
environment saturated with supporters of the 1973 coup and dictatorship. In the 1988 
plebiscite, which saw high turnout and oversight by international observers, 44% of 
Chile voted to keep General Pinochet in power.  Many members of the public refused 
to discuss the crimes committed by the armed forces and DINA/CNI (the secret 
police) and their silence became a form of denial. The 1990 truth commission 
instituted by President Patricio Aylwin was able to document some of the 
dictatorship’s human rights violations, but failed to convince Pinochet supporters that 
these crimes were unjustified, sparked a violent backlash, and ended in the silencing 
of discussion.  
Chile’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission(CNVR) was founded with the 
limited goal of investigating and documenting the murders or disappearances of 
persons from September 11, 1973 to March 11, 1990.  The commission was denied 
subpoena powers by the Right in the legislature and thus its eight commissioners 
relied heavily on investigations done by major human rights organizations and left-
wing political parties.28 There was no official military evidence presented and the 
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 In 1990 Pinochet remained Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces and enjoyed support from the 
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York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012) p.109.  
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testimony given by witnesses and relatives all occurred behind closed doors. After 
nine months, an 1800 page report was completed and released to the general public. 
This Rettig report, named after the chair of the commission, did not name specific 
perpetrators but acknowledged over 2000 victims and recommended a series of 
reparations for victims’ families.29 The report began with a very narrow mandate and 
powers but was able to produce a “meticulous recognition of the most heinous 
abuses…with a solid, defensible methodological grounding.”30  
Unfortunately the Rettig report did not succeed in convincing perpetrators that the 
crimes were unjustified and some continued to deny that human rights violations had 
occurred. Augusto Pinochet released a long statement voicing his “fundamental 
disagreement” with the Rettig report and insisting that that the army has “saved the 
freedom and sovereignty of the homeland.”31 The army declared that the report had, 
“neither legal nor historical validity.”32  Even the Supreme Court, in upholding a 1978 
Amnesty law that prevented prosecutions of Pinochet and other officials, unanimously 
declared the Rettig report “an absurd critique…tinged with political passions.”33 It 
became extraordinarily difficult, however, to deny that human rights violations had 
occurred after the publicized exhumation of clandestine mass graves at Pisagua and 
Paine. Historian Steve Stern argues that Pinochet’s supporters then turned to 
justifying the crimes as “regrettable, yet necessary excesses it is best to leave in the 
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 Report of the Chilean National Commission on Truth and Reconciliation (Notre Dame, IN: Center 
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 Priscilla Hayner. Unspeakable Truths: Transitional Justice and the Challenge of Truth Commissions. 
(London: Routledge, 2010). p.48  
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past in order to progress.”34  The Alywin government’s approach to acknowledging 
past atrocities failed to motivate a mea culpa from the real perpetrators.  
The Truth and Reconciliation Commission also produced a violent response from 
the radical left that silenced discussion and allowed the far right to perpetuate a story 
of heroic victimhood.  Jaime Guzmán, one of Pinochet’s closest advisors and 
collaborators during the dictatorship, was assassinated on April 1, 1991. Guzmán was 
a member of Congress, founder of the UDI conservative political party, and an 
outspoken loyalist to Pinochet. His death, just three weeks after the release of the 
Commission’s report and at the hands of the far-left guerrilla group FPMR, is still 
memorialized and allowed the Right to shift attention and blame to the Left.35 After 
Guzmán’s death, public talk of reconciliation stopped.36 The violence produced by the 
Rettig report proved counterproductive to having Pinochet-regime officials 
acknowledge guilt.  
The CNVR of 1990 was not the only truth commission held in Chile. In 2004, a 
second truth commission was established to identify and make monetary reparations 
to Chileans who had suffered political imprisonment and torture during the 
dictatorship. The commission, led by Sergio Valech, officially acknowledged, for the 
first time, more than 38,000 victims of torture or political imprisonment. However the 
commission was created more than a decade after the return to democracy and a series 
of events including Pinochet’s arrest, financial scandals, and the trials of several 
military officers.  It is thus impossible to interpret public responses to the Valech 
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report without the prior shifts in general opinion37 and the effects of transitional 
justice mechanisms occurring simultaneously.  
Prosecutions 
At the start of the transition, criminal prosecution of the leaders and perpetrators 
of human rights violations were severely hampered by a 1978 Amnesty Law and the 
continued power and influence of the armed forces. However towards the end of the 
1990s, Pinochet’s associates has largely retired from the branches of power, 
international norms were pressing for criminal accountability, and a few judges had 
began reinterpreting the Amnesty Law and initiating prosecutions. By 1997 there 
were more than 200 cases in the courts dealing with cases of the disappeared. An 
intrepid judge even began investigating Pinochet’s involvement in the infamous 
Caravan of Death.38 All of this occurred prior to the arrest of Pinochet in London and 
has since culminated with the Chilean Supreme Court’s revocation of Pinochet’s 
parliamentary immunity and the arrests and convictions of hundreds of officers.39 The 
watershed of prosecutions and the debate surrounding Pinochet’s arrest have been 
influential in diminishing pinochetismo.  However, the positive effects of 
prosecutions are not independent from prior personnel changes within the military and 
the judicial branch.  
The first major step in prosecuting past officials, came from discovering a legal 
loophole in the Amnesty laws. Unsolved disappearances could be designated as 
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“aggravated kidnappings” which would make the crimes ongoing and thus 
prosecutable. This logic was used to prosecute five senior military officers in 1997 
and opened the dockets to hundreds of other cases.40  However there were still 
significant legal hurdles to prosecuting the commander behind the killings or 
kidnappings. Pinochet possessed parliamentary immunity in Chile, which could only 
be revoked with powerful evidence of guilt, and there were still strong supporters of 
Pinochet in Congress and the courts.  
The most dramatic prosecution step thus occurred outside of Chile.  British 
authorities arrested Augosto Pinochet in October of 1998 during his visit to London 
for medical treatment. The international arrest warrant came from a Spanish judge 
who claimed that Pinochet’s involvement in the torture of Spanish citizens was a 
crime against humanity subject to universal jurisdiction. Spain’s attempts to extradite 
Pinochet to Madrid to stand trial showed a shift in international norms and sparked 
intense international political and academic debate. Inside Chile, “[h]is arrest forced 
conversations and arguments among political and not-so-political citizens, between 
parents and children, in public and in private.”41  Fistfights erupted in Chile’s 
Congress during the traditionally somber State of the Union address in 199942 and the 
public finally began to discuss and debate assumptions about the violent coup. 
Pinochet’s prosecution, although never completed, was much more successful than a 
truth commission in sparking public debate and a reevaluation of the justifications for 
the violent coup.  
The impact of taking prosecutorial action against the figurehead of the 
dictatorship has been explored by Alan Angell and reflected in public opinion polls.  
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Alan Angell summarizes how Chile had gone to great lengths in documenting and 
acknowledging past human rights abuses but prior to the arrest of Pinochet, Chile had 
failed to discuss whether perpetration of these crimes was justified. Opinions on guilt 
could not be shifted until a debate about the justifications. Alan remarks, “What 
marked Chilean politics after 1990 until the arrest of Pinochet was the absence of 
debate between the two sides over the coup, its causes and consequences…Witness 
the brusque dismissal of the Rettig report by the Armed Forces, its political allies and 
even the Supreme Court. They were right and justified, and the government was 
wrong. Full stop.”43 The viable threat of international prosecution and intense media 
focus ended this lack of dialogue. People were forced to reexamine the past and for 
the first time 63% of Chileans admitted that Pinochet was guilty of ordering the death 
of dissidents in Chile.44 Between January of 1999 and April of 1999 this figure rose to 
69%.45  The critical examination of Pinochet’s actions was made possible by a highly 
politicized trial.  
 It is important to note that the prosecutions and their impacts were dependent 
on drastic changes in the personnel of the courts and military. In 1997, the Supreme 
Court increased from 17 to 21 members and there was mandatory retirement for 
judges over the age of 75. These changes meant that only four of the 17 Pinochet 
appointees remained in place when the Supreme Court affirmed a lower court ruling 
that stripped Pinochet of his parliamentary immunity. 46  In addition to changes in the 
composition of the courts, the military also saw the retirement of all generals closely 
tied to Pinochet and the dictatorship. Generational changes and the new General 
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Ricardo Izurieta’s deference to democratic norms drastically reduced the threat of a 
second military coup or intervention. The military went from visible demonstrations 
in the streets at the threat of prosecutions, to begrudgingly participating in the Mesa 
de Diálogo (Forum for Dialogue) with human rights organizations and accepting the 
arrest of Pinochet. The evolution to “talks not tanks” 47 suggests that the military had 
already gradually distanced itself from the dictatorship by 1998.48 
Public Commemorations 
Official commemoration of the violence and victims under Pinochet has also 
been rife with political divisions but has been relatively unsuccessful at diminishing 
pinochetismo. While prosecutions could maintain a veneer of political impartiality, 
public memorials have been closely tied to the political agenda of presidential 
administrations and thus easily dismissed by Pinochet supporters as “left-wing 
propaganda.”  Moreover the increasing advocacy by human rights groups for 
memorials has sparked a strong counter-movement by Pinochet supporters 
commemorating and glorifying the coup and members of the dictatorship. All of these 
factors combine to create increased polarization rather than “societal soul-
searching.”49  
The politicization of official memorials and acts of commemoration has been 
particularly marked in the creation of the Villa Grimaldi, Salvador Allende Memorial, 
and Museum of Memory and Human Rights. In 1997, victims groups successfully 
advocated to turn Villa Grimaldi, the former clandestine torture center, into a 
historical monument or “Peace Park.”  President Michelle Bachelet, a member of the 
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socialist party and former torture victim at Grimaldi, paid a much-publicized visit to 
Villa Grimaldi one week after the Chilean Supreme refused to recognize the full Inter-
American Human Rights Court’s ruling that Chile’s amnesty law was illegal.50  An 
even more explicit connection between political agendas and official 
commemorations was made at the start of the democratic transition. In 1991, leaders 
of the Socialist party and the center-left Party for Democracy (PPD), faced a 
fragmented left still seeking public acknowledgment of past human rights violations. 
Politicians sought to address this civilian discontent and maintain a unified coalition 
by proposing legislation to place Ex-President Allende’s remains in the prestigious51 
General Cemetery of Santiago under a public memorial.52  Official commemoration 
not only can change the political historical narratives, it can also set the legacy of a 
future president. President Lagos made a visit to Paine’s memorial to the disappeared 
his last official act in office and President Bachelet rushed to finish the construction 
of the Museum of Memory and Human Rights before her term expired. 
Commemoration has allowed the government to symbolically acknowledge victims 
and survivors and given politicians the moral high ground as defenders of human 
rights. However the highly politicized nature of the process has hampered efforts for 
genuine discussion and reexamination of the past.  
Official commemoration has unfortunately also sparked a counter movement 
by Pinochet supporters that glorify the coup and heroize participants in the 
dictatorship. The right-wing Independent Democratic Party (UDI) created a major 
memorial to Jaime Guzmán, the Senator and Pinochet loyalist killed by leftist radicals 
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after the publication of the Rettig report, and placed it in the center of Santiago. The 
memorial, which sits across from the United States Embassy, is a large water pool 
with rows of sculpted human forms and a sleek underground meeting room. More 
than 2,000 Pinochet loyalists came to the inauguration of the memorial in 2008. 
President Bachelet did not come and was criticized for refusing to honor an 
assassinated Senator.53  Pinochet loyalists also fought vehemently to keep a major 
Santiago street named Avenida de la 11 de Septiembre (“September 11th Avenue”) in 
order to commemorate the day Chile was liberated from “Marxist oppression.”54  The 
funeral of Augusto Pinochet was perhaps the most contested form of public 
commemoration.55 The right wing fought hard to give Pinochet a state funeral and 
official internment in the General Cemetery.56  Although they failed, the presidential 
sash, one of the most essential symbols of the Chilean presidential office, was draped 
of Pinochet’s coffin and more than 20,000 people turned out to support the dead 
dictator.57  Memorials, monuments, and official acts all have the ability to spark 
counterdemonstrations that allow perpetrators or supporters of human rights abuses to 
be glorified.  
Truth commissions, prosecutions, and public commemorations have all been 
applied in Chile yet the historical narrative remains divided. Truth commissions 
documented the violence of the coup and the dictatorship but failed to address the 
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justifications or denials of guilt. Prosecutions sparked public debate about the 
innocence of perpetrators but were a slow watershed process that relied on personnel 
changes within the courts and the armed forces. These internal changes mean that 
diminished support for Pinochet could be both a cause and effect of prosecutions. The 
third strategy commonly used after atrocities, official acts of commemoration or 
memorialization, was the most counterproductive to eliminating pinochetismo. It was 
highly partisan and prompted Pinochet supporters to simply make counter-
monuments.  Chile has a unique history compared to other transitioning or 
transitioned democracies58 therefore decreasing support for Pinochet has required a 
combination of both transitional justice mechanisms and surprise events.   
Alternative Methods 
Despite the failure of transitional justice mechanisms, support for and 
justification of Pinochet has diminished. It has diminished thanks to two unanticipated 
events that strike at the overlooked and most powerful sources of ongoing support: the 
perceived integrity of Pinochet and the economic consequences of his rule.  
Pinochet’s personal corruption came to light thanks to the United States 
Senate. The American Patriot Act, passed in the wake of 9/11, included several anti-
money laundering provisions. In 2003 the Subcommittee on Investigations was asked 
to investigate the effectiveness of these provisions. This extensive investigation led to 
the discovery that Augusto Pinochet had constructed a web of at least 125 U.S. bank 
and securities accounts, many under false names, to move millions of dollars.59 
Follow-up work revealed that Pinochet was hiding over $27 million USD in secret 
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accounts and tax havens. Shattering the perceptions of a selfless, austere General was 
crucial to reevaluations of the coup and the regime. The Chilean dictatorship was one 
of the most personalized of all policide regimes in South America60 and thus 
Pinochet’s reputation was bedrock to the regime’s legitimacy.61  In the year following 
revelations about Pinochet’s financial holdings, hundreds of prosecutions against the 
military government were sped up and Pinochet lost countless key supporters. Senator 
Hernán Larraín of the UDI, the Pinochet loyal party of the Right, announced that he 
“would not put hands in the fire” to defend Pinochet.62 The Supreme Court reversed 
its decision upholding Pinochet’s immunity, retired army generals could not be 
enticed to defend Pinochet, and in 2006 his daughter Inés fled the country.63  
Investigations into the financial records of those most tied to the military government 
were extremely effective in discrediting the regime. It additionally avoided being 
dismissed as a leftist political tactic because a foreign government, motivated by 
unrelated goals, implemented the investigation.  
The second unplanned event that successfully caused a reevalution of the past 
was the Student Movement of 2011. In 2011, High School and University students 
from across the country went on a massive 7-month strike.64 Universities were shut 
down, hundreds of thousands of students marched in the streets, and the movement’s 
demands became the daily front-page news. The Chilean students were demanding 
that the government restore free higher education.  Pinochet’s neoliberal 
macroeconomic policies had privatized education and abolished the free universal 
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education introduced by President Allende. As a consequence, Chile currently has the 
second most expensive private university system of any OCED country and Chilean 
families typically shoulder at least 85% of the cost.65 Social mobilization put the 
spotlight on these drawbacks and allowed Chile to finally question an economic 
model that had led to high GDP growth. Carlos Huneeus explains how questioning 
neoliberalism strikes at the heart of the dictatorship’s legacy. He states that the 
authoritarian government had two faces: “one characterized by political coercion and 
the other by the promotion of economic freedom.”66 Human rights groups had long 
criticized the political coercion of the regime but the Chilean student movement was 
the first to criticize the economic reforms. The impact of the mobilization is seen by a 
survey conducted in 2013.  The results indicated that by 2013, 56% of Chilean society 
viewed the dictatorship years as “bad” and only 8% viewed the era as “good.”67 This 
contrasted sharply with results taken a decade before where one third of Chileans 
remembered the coup as salvation from Marxism, and 29% remembered the 




This paper has shown the many processes used to diminish loyalty and 
justifications for perpetrators of human rights violations in Chile. Pinochetismo 
persists in Chilean society but a gradual, if sometimes halting, process has produced 
significant public and political shifts. Space constraints prevent this paper from 
delving into the entire evolution of memory or reconciliation and justice in Chile and 
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the dogged efforts of human rights organizations and victims advocacy groups.   
Instead it focuses a critical lens on three mechanisms of transitional justice and their 
impacts on the supporters of the coup and regime. The analysis shows that all three 
mechanisms were constrained by historical and political context and varied 
substantially in their impacts. The Truth Commissions prevented collective amnesia 
but did not convince supporters that the crimes were wrong. Prosecutions, on the 
other hand, brought questions of guilt into the public spotlight and were able to foster 
a watershed of condemnations and criminal investigations. The efficacy of 
prosecutions compared to truth commissions reflected the cautious and contentious 
expansion of democracy and gradual reduction of Pinochet supporters on the benches 
of justice and in the ranks of the Military. Despite these gradual advances, public 
commemorations could not prevent citizen backlash and a transformation of the 
morality debate into a political debate. The highly symbolic properties of memorials 
or museums were used as political tools that allowed perpetrators to dismiss human 
rights as a political ploy and highlight their own “martyrs.” Despite the flaws or 
drawbacks of truth commissions, prosecutions, and public commemorations, 
pinochetismo has still declined. Since the 1988, plebiscite Chilean society has begun 
to acknowledge that the 1973 coup was not necessary and that the Pinochet’s military 
rule was brutally repressive, corrupt, and not beneficial to all of society or even the 
economy. The main instigators of change have come through unplanned avenues, one 
from a foreign Senate and the other from a bottom-up social movement, and together 
illustrate the power of not relying on politicized or intentional policy proscriptions.  
Chile should be left to wrestle with competing historical narratives as current trends 
of declining pinochetismo continue and new generations adopt different norms. The 




where it is no longer a threat to stability. It may vanish, although we can’t predict 
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